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Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated
individuals when they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals
then need to use a conditional strategy to deter their interaction partners
from defecting. Responding to defection such that the future payoff of a
defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called a partner control
mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i) to switch from
cooperation to defection when being defected (‘positive reciprocity’), (ii) to
actively reduce the payoff of a defecting partner (‘punishment’), or (iii) to
stop interacting and switch partner (‘partner switching’). However, such
mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often studied in isolation from
each other. In order to better understand the conditions under which each
partner control mechanism tends to be favoured by selection, we here ana-
lyse by way of individual-based simulations the coevolution between
positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching. We show that
random interactions in an unstructured population and a high number of
rounds increase the likelihood that selection favours partner switching. In
contrast, interactions localized in small groups (without genetic structure)
increase the likelihood that selection favours punishment and/or positive
reciprocity. This study thus highlights the importance of comparing different
control mechanisms for cooperation under different conditions.
1. Introduction
Interactions where all participants gain a direct net fitness benefit, namely
cooperation, are widespread in natural populations [1]. Many cases of
cooperation involve investments; that is, the reduction of current personal
payoff by some amount in order to increase the partner’s payoff. This obser-
vation raises the question how individuals can ensure that their investments
yield future benefits; that is, how they can avoid being defected by their partner
over repeated bouts of interactions. When individuals engage in repeated inter-
actions over their lifespan, the evolution of cooperation is often modelled as an
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where individuals have to choose whether to
cooperate or defect at each interaction stage. The payoffs are such that mutual
cooperation yields a higher payoff than mutual defection, while to defect yields
a higher payoff than to cooperate in each single round, irrespective of the part-
ner’s action, hence the dilemma. In order to deter a partner from defecting and
stabilizing cooperation in a repeated game, an individual can use a conditional
strategy that reduces a defecting partner’s payoff relative to that of cooperating
with it. We define the broad type of such a conditional response as a partner
control mechanism [2].
Different types of partner control mechanisms have been proposed to stabil-
ize cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Perhaps the most
well known is positive reciprocity, where cooperative acts are reciprocated by
cooperation in future interactions, whereas defection is not, thus making defec-
tion unfavourable in the long run. An often-studied strategy using positive
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reciprocity as a partner control mechanism is tit-for-tat (TFT),
which starts by cooperating and then in subsequent rounds
implements the previous action of the partner [3–5].
Although positive reciprocity is often favoured by selection
in evolutionary models [3,6–8], its relevance outside
humans has been questioned ([9], but see [10,11]).
Another partner control mechanism is punishment,
which comes at an immediate payoff cost to the actor, but
also reduces the payoff of a defector relative to cooperating
[12–14]. Although punishment thus comes at a cost to the
punisher, this can be overcome if punishment results in the
partner being more cooperative in the long run. Punishment
can be favoured by selection in evolutionary models of
repeated interactions [12], and examples of punishment as a
partner control mechanism can be found in natural
populations (reviewed in [15]).
Still another partner control mechanism is partner switch-
ing [16–20]. By partner switching an individual can avoid
being exploited by a defector by simply stopping the inter-
action. Although switching entails an opportunity cost
because it necessitates finding a new partner, it has been
shown to be favoured by selection in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game [18], and several examples of partner
switching have been suggested in nature [21–23].
For individuals interacting in an iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner
switching are predicted as main partner control mechanisms
capable of stabilizing cooperation [2]. However, the evolution
of these three main types of partner control mechanisms for
cooperation is generally investigated in isolation from each
other. It thus remains unclear under which conditions selec-
tion will favour one mechanism over another. More
recently, however, different partner control mechanisms
have been investigated together [17,19]. In a landmark
study, Izquierdo et al. [19] have shown that selection favours
partner switching over TFT. However, this study has
assumed that switching does not incur any costs, it excluded
the strategic option to punish partners, and restricted the
analysis to a population with random interactions only,
which are all factors that may change which mechanism is
favoured by selection. In order to predict which partner con-
trol mechanisms are likely to be observed in natural
populations, it is important to consider the coevolution of
positive reciprocity, partner switching, and punishment,
and understand the conditions under which one partner con-
trol mechanism is favoured over the others by selection.
Here, we present an evolutionarymodel wherewe let posi-
tive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching co-evolve
when interactions are random in the population and when
they occur in groups in a panmictic population (i.e. no genetic
structure within groups, Haystack model of population struc-
ture [24]). The aim of this study is to identify the partner
control mechanisms favoured under different conditions,
and we therefore chose the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a
payoff matrix for the pairwise interactions, where defection
always yields a higher single round payoff, and thus selection
for responding to defection is strong.We explore the role of the
proximate costs and benefits of cooperation, punishment, and
switching on these dynamics, as well as the role of interactions
localized to groups and the duration of punishment. Our
results show that, when interactions occur at random between
all population members, the likelihood that partner switching
is favoured by selection increases if the number of interactions
in an individual’s lifespan increases. However, when inter-
actions are localized to groups, we find that punishment
generally dominates in sizable groups, unless punishment effi-
ciency is reduced. In the latter case, we do find conditions
where positive reciprocity outcompetes alternative partner
control mechanisms, but wewere unable to identify a particu-
lar factor that would consistently favour it.
2. The model
(a) Population and lifecycle
We consider a haploid population of constant size with a
total number of N ¼ d ! n adult individuals, which are
subdivided into d groups of equal size n. The lifecycle is
marked by the following events. First, group members
interact socially with each other and accumulate payoffs.
Next, each individual produces a large number of offspring
proportionally to accumulated payoff, and dies. Finally,
offspring disperse randomly (with probability 1/d to a
given group, including the natal one) and compete randomly
with exactly n individuals reaching adulthood in each group.
Hence, the population is panmictic (no genetic structure will
be obtained).
(b) Social interactions
In the social interaction phase of the lifecycle, individuals
play a repeated game for T rounds, whose stage game con-
sists of a pairwise extensive-form game (see [25] for a
description of different types of games). The per-round exten-
sive-form game consists of five sequential moves where the
individuals of a pair choose actions simultaneously during
each move (figure 1), and where pair rematching may occur
during each round, as follows.
Move 0: random pairing. Each unpaired individual (all indi-
viduals in the first round) gets randomly paired with another
unpaired individual. Individuals cannot influence this pro-
cess, i.e. there is no partner choice.
Move 1: the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each individual in a pair
can either cooperate (action C) or defect (action D). To
cooperate means paying a payoff cost Ch to contribute a
payoff benefit Bh to the partner, whereas defection has no
effect on payoff.
Move 2: leaving. Each individual can either leave its part-
ner (action L) or stay (action S) and a pairbond is broken if
at least one individual leaves. A payoff cost of C1 is paid by
both individuals of a broken pair and only unbroken pairs
are engaged in the forthcoming move 3 and 4, otherwise,
individuals are added to a pool of individuals that will be
paired in move 0 of the next round.
Move 3: punishment. Each individual in a pair can either
opt to punish its partner (action P) or not punish (action
N). Playing action P incurs a payoff cost Cp to self and
reduces by Dp the payoff of the partner. Only punished
individuals enter the next move.
Move 4: response to punishment. A punished individual has
three possible (re)actions available. (i) It receives the punish-
ment but ‘ignores’ it and does not change any future action if
the pairbond is maintained (action I). (ii) The individual
leaves its partner, namely it expresses action L as in move 2
with the same payoff consequences. (iii) The individual
alters its behaviour (action A), which means that, if it
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played action D (C) in move 1, it will cooperate (defect) in the
next z rounds in move 1. An individual that has switched to
defection (cooperation) owing to punishment and is pun-
ished again, will again change its behaviour in move 1 for z
rounds.
In addition to a fixed cost C1 of partner switching, we also
consider an alternative cost function for individuals that leave
(or were left) in either move 2 or 4, where the cost depends on
the number of unpaired individuals at the end of a round. For
this, we consider the function
ClðiÞ ¼ a1þ ik , ð2:1Þ
which decreases as the number i of unpaired individuals in
the population increases, where a . 0 determines the maxi-
mum cost, and k . 0 the shape. Thus, we assume that if a
larger number of individuals is searching for a partner,
then the cost of finding a partner is reduced.
(c) Strategies
We assume that individuals use pure strategies, which deter-
ministically specify the actions to be taken at moves 1–4 of
the stage game, possibly conditionally on past actions. The
strategy of an individual for the entire game is specified by
a vector s ¼ (x1, x2, x3, x4), where xk represents the move-
wise strategy the individual uses when faced with a choice
at move k [ f1, 2, 3, 4g:
In the electronic supplementary material, table S1, we list
all move-wise strategies, which are obtained as follows. We
assume that the strategy for move 1 specifies an action
taken when the individual first interacts with its partner,
and an action taken in subsequent rounds is conditioned on
what the partner did in the previous round in move
1. This move-wise strategy can thus be written as a1aCaD,
where a1; aC; aD [ fC, Dg: Here, a1 is the action taken the
first time the two individuals in a pair interact, aC is the
action taken if the partner cooperated in the previous
round, and aD is the action taken if the partner defected in
the previous round. We thus have a total of 8 (23) move-
wise strategies for move 1: fCCC, CCD, CDC, CDD, DCC,
DCD, DDC, DDDg.
For move 2, the decision to leave or stay is assumed to be
conditional on the action taken by the partner in move 1 of
the current round. Hence, the move-wise strategy can be writ-
ten as aCaD, where aC [ fL,Sg (aD [ fL,Sg) gives the action
taken when the partner cooperated (defected), whereby
x2 [ fLL,LS, SL,SSg:
Likewise, for move 3, the decision to punish or not to
punish the partner is assumed to be conditional on the
action taken by the partner in move 1, so that the move-
wise strategy is aCaD, where aC [ fP,Ng (aD [ fP, Ng) is
the action taken when the partner cooperated (defected),
whereby x3 [ fPP, PN, NP, NNg: Importantly though, we
assume that if an individual punishes its partner in this
move and the pair is not broken in the next move, then the
individual expresses in move 1 of the next round the same
action it expressed in this round. This is assumed to avoid
individuals responding to the action of the partner both by
punishing and by (possibly) changing their own action in
move 1 of the following round, and thus take two conditional
actions as a response to one action of its partner. Because we
want to compare strategies that differ in their response to
defecting individuals, we did not allow individuals that
punish in the current round to take a conditional action in
move 1 of the following round. Finally, the response to pun-
ishment in move 4 is simply given by x4 [ fI,A,Lg:
(d) Removing phenotypically indistinguishable
strategies
As there are eight different alternatives for x1, 4 for x2 and x3, 3
for x4 (see electronic supplementary material, table S1), there is
a total of 384 strategies. However, given the set-up of our
model, many strategies in the strategy space are phenotypically
indistinguishable. By phenotypically indistinguishable strat-
egies, we mean those strategies that at no point in the game
would act differently from one another, and so will be neutral
in an evolutionary model. Therefore, to decrease the complex-
ity of the model, we removed strategies from the strategy space
as follows. Per set of phenotypically indistinguishable strat-
egies, only one strategy was used. For example, consider the
set of strategies with the same move-wise strategy for move 1
(e.g. x1 ¼ CCC) and that always leaves the partner in move 2
(x2 ¼ LL). Strategies from this set never reach move 3 and 4,
and thus will always behave similarly, despite having different
move-wise strategies for these moves. The 92 strategies that
remain after removing phenotypically indistinguishable
strategies are shown in the supplementary material (table S3).
(e) Pooling strategies into classes
Although there are many strategies in the model, we are
mainly interested in cooperative strategies that differ in
their response to defection, i.e. cooperative strategies using
different partner control mechanisms. A cooperative strategy
is defined as a strategy that, when paired with another coop-
erative strategy, will always cooperate in move 1 of the game,
without punishing or leaving the partner. Within the set of
cooperative strategies, we can distinguish between classes
of strategies that differ in their partner control mechanism:
no response (no control), conditional play in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (move 1), leaving (move 2), or punishment
leave
move 0: random
pairing of unpaired 
individuals
move 1: 
cooperate
or defect
move 2: 
leave
or stay
move 3: 
punish or
not
move 4: 
response to 
punishment
no
punishment
ignore/
alter
leave
Figure 1. Chain of events per generation. The five moves are repeated for T rounds. After looping T times, the next generation is produced, and the parental one
dies.
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(move 3). Each of these four classes consists of three strategies
that differ only in their response to punishment (move 4).
Because we are interested in comparing partner control mech-
anisms, when comparing frequencies of strategies, we will do
so according to class, i.e. in our analysis, we will always pool
the frequencies of the strategies belonging to the same class.
Here, we will give a verbal description of each of the six
classes of strategies that we consider (electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S2). Each strategy of the positive
reciprocity class (denoted Rc) cooperates on the first inter-
action. It cooperates in subsequent rounds if the partner
cooperated in the previous round and defects if the partner
defected in the previous round, without leaving or punishing
the partner. Each strategy of the partner switching class
(denoted Sc) cooperates on the first round, cooperates if the
partner cooperates, does not punish, but leaves as soon as
the partner defects. Each strategy of the punishment class
(denoted Pc) cooperates on the first round, cooperates in sub-
sequent rounds, does not leave, but punishes a partner that
defects. Each strategy of the always cooperate (denoted Cc)
and always defect class (denoted Dc) always cooperates
(defects), and does not express any conditional play in
move 1–3. The remaining 92 2 5 ! 3 ¼ 77 strategies will
be pooled in ‘rest’.
( f ) Analyses
In order to analyse the model, we used individual-based
simulations to track the frequencies of the six classes of strat-
egies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and ‘rest’) in the population over
generations. Strategies are assumed to be inherited from
parent to offspring with probability 12 m. With probability
m, the offspring mutates to another strategy taken at
random among all remaining strategies. To form the next
generation of offspring, we use multinomial sampling over
the aggregate payoff of each strategy type of the parental gen-
eration with a baseline payoff guaranteeing there can be no
negative payoff (Wright–Fisher process, [26]).
For all reported results (figures 2 and 3), we ran the simu-
lations for 106 generations and computed the time average
frequency of the six classes of strategies starting with uni-
formly sampled initial frequencies. We also evaluated the
total frequency of cooperation in the population, which we
define as the average frequency over the whole population
and length of the repeated game of the pairs of individuals
in the population where both individuals in the pair
cooperated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
3. Results
We first present results assuming that the population consists
of a single group (d ¼ 1, n ¼ 10 000), so that the pairing pro-
cess (move 0, figure 1) is random at the population level. We
will refer to this as the well-mixed case. Then, we introduce
group structure (d ¼ 250, varying n), where the pairing pro-
cess occurs at the group level but with otherwise similar
parameters to show how this factor alters the relative effec-
tiveness of each partner control mechanism.
(a) Well-mixed population
Our results are based on the following baseline parameter
values: Bh ¼ 2, Ch ¼ 1, Dp ¼ 2, Cp ¼ 1, C1 ¼ 1, m ¼ 0.01,
whereas we let T vary between 1 and 30 (table 1) and set
z ¼ T, so that the behavioural change after punishment lasts
indefinitely. We find that the average frequency of
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Figure 2. Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc,
and rest) plotted as a function of the number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh ¼ 2, Ch ¼ 1, Dp ¼ 2, Cp ¼ 1, z ¼ T, m ¼ 0.01,
d ¼ 1, n ¼ 10 000. Panel specific parameters: C1 ¼ 1 (a), C1 ¼ 5 (b), using equation (2.1) with a ¼ 100, k ¼ 0.9 (c).
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Figure 3. Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and rest)
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(a), C1¼1, z ¼ 5 (b), C1 ¼ 0, z ¼ 5 (c).
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cooperation in the population is strongly dependent on the
number of rounds (T ) per generation (figure 2a, black line).
When the game is one shot (T ¼ 1), conditional strategies
are unable to affect payoff or behaviour in future rounds,
and thus cooperation is selected against (less than 1%),
which is consistent with the standard result that defection
is favoured in such cases [3]. As the number of rounds is
increased, the frequency of cooperation quickly increases,
with more than 90% of mutual cooperation for T & 6.
Additionally, we find that the number of rounds has a
strong influence on which partner control mechanism is
favoured by selection. Our main results are as follows.
For 4 ' T ' 6, we find that the positive reciprocity class
(Rc) is dominant (figure 2a). Here, the number of rounds is
very low, and thus the costs of punishment or partner switch-
ing in the first rounds cannot be negated in later rounds of
mutual cooperation. Switching to defection to minimize
payoff losses is more beneficial for the lifetime payoff and
thus the Rc class is selected for.
For intermediate T (7 ' T ' 9), we find that the punish-
ment class (Pc) dominates (figure 2a). Although Rc and Pc
strategies gain equal payoffs when paired with each other,
their respective payoff gain will differ considerably when
paired with a defector. An Rc strategy switches to defection
when paired with a defector resulting in both players gaining
the baseline payoff. A Pc strategy, however, continues to
cooperatewhile punishing defection. If the recipient of punish-
ment switches to play cooperate, then through several rounds
of mutual cooperation, a Pc strategy is likely to obtain more
payoff than an Rc strategy. This difference in payoff between
Rc and Pc when matched with defectors may thus explain
why for a higher number of rounds of interaction selection
will favour the Pc class over the Rc class. However, not all
strategies respond to punishment by altering behaviour, and
thus Pc strategies cannot force all individuals to cooperate.
Some partnerships can therefore be very costly for these indi-
viduals as they pay double costs (cooperating and punishing).
Finally, for largeT (T & 10),we find that the switching class
(Sc) dominates the population (figure 2a). Strategies in the Sc
class do not face the problem of prolonged costly partnerships
as they will always leave uncooperative individuals. Two Sc
strategies will therefore always manage to find each other in
a well-mixed population, given enough rounds. When the
number of rounds increases, Sc strategies will have more
rounds to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation once a coop-
erative partner has been found, and thus the Sc class
outcompetes both the Rc and the Pc class for T & 10. If the
cost of switching is increased to C1 ¼ 5, however, then the
number of rounds needed for the Sc class to dominate is
increased to T & 70 (figure 2b). In all simulations where d ¼ 1
(single group), we find that switching is generally favoured
when T is large enough. The finding that a high number
of rounds favours partner switching is robust even when
the cost of switching increases exponentially with fewer
number of unpaired individuals (using equation (2.1), a ¼ 100,
k ¼ 0.9, figure 2c; see the electronic supplementary material,
section SM-II.2 for other parameter values).
(b) Group-structured population
We now introduce group structure (without genetic structure
as dispersal is random to any group) into the population, set-
ting the number of groups (d ) to 250 while varying group size
(n). Otherwise, we use the same set of parameter values as
in the baseline case for the well-mixed population (Bh ¼ 2,
Ch ¼ 1, Dp ¼ 2, Cp ¼ 1, C1 ¼ 1, m ¼ 0.01, figure 2a) with T ¼
30 and z ¼ T. Our main aim is to determine the conditions
where the Sc class dominates in frequency.
Interestingly, switching only dominates in very large
groups (n & 300, figure 3a). Instead, we find that the Pc
class is dominant for any group size lower than 300. The Pc
class coexists in these simulations with a strategy that
always defects, punishes other defectors, and alters behav-
iour if punished. While the Pc individuals can force such
individuals to cooperate, other strategies will either be
exploited or punished.
To determine the robustness of the result that the Pc class
tends to dominate in a group-structured population, we
relaxed the assumption of punishment altering behaviour
for the lifetime of the individual (in move 4). Such a strong
effect of punishment is unlikely to occur in nature, and pun-
ished individuals may attempt to defect again after several
interactions. We find that the evolutionary success of punish-
ment is strongly dependent on this parameter. If z ¼ 5, then
the Pc class is still dominant in groups up to a size of 52
(figure 3b). In larger groups however, it is first the Rc class
that dominates, whereas for n & 76, the Sc class is dominant.
Strikingly, if the cost of switching partner is absent as well
(C1 ¼ 0), the Sc class is still outcompeted by the Pc class in
small groups (n ' 28, figure 3c). This may stem from the
fact that if individuals interact in small groups, a partner
switcher may be rematched with the individual it left on
the previous round and may end up repeatedly interacting
with the same defector (despite switching every round).
The Pc class therefore still dominates in small groups,
because its payoff is mostly dependent on how a defecting
individual responds to punishment, but not on the compo-
sition of the group it is in. This effect largely persists in a
structured population if T is small, unless the cost of punish-
ment is doubled, in which case the Rc class takes over
(electronic supplementary material, figure S4).
(c) Sensitivity analysis
To test the robustness of the various results presented here,
we have performed additional analyses testing a larger part
Table 1. List of parameters.
parameter meaning
Bh benefit to the recipient of a cooperative act
Ch cost of a cooperative act
Dp payoff reduction for target of punishment
Cp cost of punishment
C1 cost of switching partner
z duration of punishment
d number of groups
n group size
T number of rounds in one generation
m mutation rate
N population size
a, k used to calculate the cost of switching in
equation (2.1)
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of the parameter space adding up to at least 15 000 different
parameter combinations for which we have run simulations.
The results of these analyses are presented in the electronic
supplementary material.
4. Discussion
Cooperative individuals can use partner control mechanisms;
that is, broad types of conditional strategies to reduce the life-
time payoff of defectors relative to cooperators. Three partner
control mechanisms (positive reciprocity, punishment, and
partner switching) have all been shown to be able to stabilize
cooperation in panmictic populations in separate models
[3,20,27]. However, few studies have investigated under
which conditions selection would favour one partner control
mechanism over another. Here, we have addressed this issue
by investigating the coevolution of these three control mech-
anisms in a panmictic population in which the interaction
structure is either well-mixed (i.e. all individuals are potential
partners) or group structured with interactions occurring
only locally among a small number of individuals (with no
genetic structure within groups). In most simulations, we
find a polymorphism where the different classes of strategies
coexist. However, it is clear that under most conditions a
specific class of strategies tends to be favoured by selection
over alternatives and thus dominates in this polymorphism.
Our key result for thewell-mixed case is that the likelihood
of partner switching being favoured by selection over positive
reciprocity, punishment, and defection increases if the number
of rounds of interaction is larger (figure 2 and electronic
supplementary material, figures S1–S3). For a fewer number
of rounds punishment and positive reciprocity tend to be
favoured, but which of the two classes dominates depends
on changes in various parameters, and thus no general con-
clusion can be reached here. When interactions are localized
to the group level, punishment is relatively more favoured in
small and moderately sized groups for otherwise similar par-
ameter values as in the well-mixed interactions case, and this
is for both a small and large number of rounds (electronic sup-
plementarymaterial, figures S4a and 3a, respectively). Positive
reciprocity dominates under certain conditions in a group-
structured populationwhen punishment efficiency is reduced;
for example, for a high number of rounds, intermediate group
size, and a lowduration of the effect of punishment (figure 3b),
or for a low number of rounds and high cost of punishment
(electronic supplementary material, figure S4c). We did not,
however, identify a specific factor that would consistently
induce positive reciprocity to dominate the other control
mechanisms. In the following,wewill first discuss each control
mechanism separately and then evaluate how our results
connect to empirical research.
(a) Switching
In our analysis, partner switching emerges as the dominant
partner control mechanism when many potential partners
exist and many interactions take place during an individual’s
lifespan, unless the cost of switching is high and the number
of rounds of interaction is insufficiently large to compensate
for these costs. These results make intuitive sense if one con-
siders how the three control mechanisms respond to
unconditional defectors: punishers and positive reciprocators
may spend their entire life with a defecting partner, whereas
partner switchers leave and will invariably end up with
another cooperative individual and hence reap the benefits
of cooperation as long as enough rounds are played.
Izquierdo et al. [19] have already shown that partner switch-
ing is a powerful partner control mechanism stabilizing
cooperation; if it is cost-free, then it dominates over positive
reciprocity. Our results extend their insights by showing
that switching can be favoured by selection over not only
positive reciprocity, but also punishment in a well-mixed
population, with the caveat that a sufficient number of
rounds of interaction must take place.
Switching (when linked to cooperation) is a cognitively
simple strategy that, via the exploration of partner behaviour,
rejects defectors and tends to assort with cooperators. It can
thus be regarded as a primitive form of partner choice.
Although more active mechanisms of partner choice exist,
such as using information about past behaviour of individ-
uals or other signals of cooperative behaviour [28,29],
partner switching allows individuals to respond to variation
in the population in the same way. This generally tends to
stabilize cooperation because, if individuals can exert some
level of choice in the presence of variation of the expression
of cooperation, the system of interacting individuals func-
tions as a biological market where cooperators end up
assorted with themselves [30,31].
A critical result of our model, however, is that the size of
the interaction group has a clear impact on the likelihood of a
partner switcher to find the right partner, and thus the evol-
utionary success of partner switching. Relaxing the
assumption of well-mixed interaction opportunities [18,19],
we find that the prevalence of partner switching diminishes
the smaller the number of potential interaction partners
gets. This conclusion holds even if partner switching is free
of opportunity costs (figure 3c). The reason for this result is
that the smaller the group the more likely it becomes that
switchers can only be rematched with their defecting partner
as nobody else is available. In other words, the market for
interaction partners becomes increasingly restricted with
decreasing numbers of potential interaction partners.
(b) Punishment
Via punishment an individual can actively attempt to change
the behaviour of its partner, by paying a small payoff cost to
reduce the payoff of its defecting partner, thereby making
cooperation more attractive. Punishment is more favoured
when the population is group structured (compared with
unstructured), up to relatively large group sizes, especially
if punishment results in the defecting recipient changing its
behaviour to cooperation indefinitely (z ¼ T, figure 3a).
Importantly, a punisher can induce cooperative behaviour
in a conditionally defecting partner but switchers cannot,
which gives punishment an advantage when the number
of potential partners and hence the number of unmatched
cooperators is limited. For the same reason, punishment out-
competes positive reciprocity for various parameter value
combinations, because within the limits of the strategy
space explored in this paper, the behaviour of the partner
and focal individual can be more easily aligned through pun-
ishment than through positive reciprocity. Therefore, we find
in group-structured populations that selection generally
favours punishment over positive reciprocity and partner
switching in sizable groups (figure 3). If one of the
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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parameters influencing punishment efficiency is changed
(i.e. high cost of punishment, low payoff reduction for the reci-
pient of punishment, or short behavioural change after being
punished), then we find that alternative classes of strategies
dominate (electronic supplementary material, figure S5).
(c) Positive reciprocity
The conditions where positive reciprocity is favoured over
punishment and partner switching are less easily character-
ized. Although in group-structured populations we find
that punishment dominates often in sizable groups
(figure 3), when punishment efficiency is decreased, there
are various conditions where positive reciprocity dominates
instead (figures 3b and electronic supplementary material,
S4 and S5). However, depending on the number of rounds
of interaction, cost of partner switching, and other par-
ameters, we also find conditions where the always defect
class or the switching class dominates in the population (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S5). In sum, there is not
a specific factor that would consistently increase the likeli-
hood of positive reciprocity dominating the population.
Our analyses suggest that Rc strategies may often be out-
competed by other control mechanisms, because Rc
individuals pairedwith defectors are unable to reach the coop-
erative outcome (both individuals play C in move 1). That is,
there exists no strategy in our strategy set that would exploit
unconditional cooperators, but that can also ‘identify’ the Rc
strategy and cooperate with it. Such strategies would require
several rounds of interaction (and thus a large memory) to
identify that the partner is playing TFT. Punishment, on the
other hand, is a much more direct signal (a single punishing
act) towhich defectors can respond. Thus, if strategy complex-
ity is limited to one round of memory, then the Sc and Pc class
can still reach the cooperative outcome when paired with a
defector, but the Rc class cannot. Therefore, even though the
Rc class avoids being exploited by defectors by switching to
play defect as well, it gains less payoff than other classes of
control mechanisms and is thus frequently outcompeted.
This does not necessarily mean that positive reciprocity can
never be favoured. As the results show, we have found con-
ditions where positive reciprocity dominates (figures 2a and
3b and electronic supplementary material). More importantly,
however, our results show that the deterministic play
and a single round of memory of our Rc class (as in the TFT
strategy) causes it to often be outcompeted by classes of strat-
egies that domanage to reach a cooperative outcomewith their
partners. Therefore, for positive reciprocity to evolve, it is
likely necessary that strategies evolve that take into account a
larger history of the interaction or play less deterministically.
(d) Connection to the empirical literature
It is still a largely unanswered question of how frequently each
of the three partner control mechanisms investigated here
occurs in natural populations. According to current evidence,
there are very few examples for punishment [15], while there
are various examples for positive reciprocity [11]. Regarding
partner switching, we are aware only of clear interspecific
examples where partner switching in response to defection
occurs. For example, in an interspecific interaction between
client and cleaner fish, it has been observed that client reef
fish with access to several cleaning stations use a partner
switching strategy in response to a defecting client even
though they could alternatively use punishment—as clients
without choice options do [22,32]. Ourmodel is, however, lim-
ited to intraspecific interactions, and thus it remains to be
investigated how much our results would be affected if inter-
acting individuals belong to two separate gene pools. In
intraspecific contexts, empirical tests of biological market
theory focus on individuals actively choosing a partner prior
to interactions based on a comparison of offers [33,34], rather
than on leaving a partner that has defected. Investigating
active choice rather than partner switching would be another
interesting avenue for future research.
Our result that partner switching does not perform well
in small groups (and hence for low behavioural variation)
is of potential importance for empirical research on
cooperation in stable groups, as is often found in primates.
It has been proposed that various trades of investments in
primates (e.g. grooming, tolerance, and support in agonistic
encounters) are stable against defection partially because of
partner switching [35]. However, it has also been argued
that social bonds in primate groups are highly differentiated
where individuals form long-term social bonds with particu-
lar individuals in the group [36]. In such groups, partner
switching may be highly restricted. Hence, our model
suggests that partner switching cannot be accepted as a
default partner control mechanism in stable groups without
convincing empirical evidence.
The most surprising result of our analyses is the success of
punishment in sizable groups, as the evidence for this partner
control mechanism in symmetric two-player interactions is
rather rare [15]. One reason for its success is the assumption
that any player can use punishment in a relative cost-efficient
way, i.e. the cost of punishing is lower than the cost of being
punished. In nature, cost efficiency is likely linked to asym-
metries between players and hence asymmetric games.
Fittingly, experimental evidence for punishment has been
reported for asymmetric games in interspecific interactions
[32,37], and the most important intraspecific context involves
the ‘pay-to-stay’ concept where helpers help and show
appeasement apparently to avoid aggression by dominant
breeders [38]. A major problem with asymmetric strength is
that it may turn a cooperation game in which punishment
stabilizes cooperation into an exploitation game in which
dominants coerce subordinates [12], i.e. defect while forcing
the partner to cooperate. For example, only larger male clea-
ner wrasse punish their smaller female partners for cheating a
joint client, a game akin to an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
[39,40]. To fully understand the effect of asymmetries
between individuals on the relative effectiveness of punish-
ment over other partner control mechanisms, this will need
to be modelled explicitly, however. In addition, further
work is needed to determine how factors such as asymme-
tries or relatedness between interacting individuals may
change the adaptiveness of each partner control mechanism.
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1SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Co-evolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in re-
peated interactions
Matthias Wubs, Redouan Bshary, Laurent Lehmann
SM-I Strategy set1
In table S1 the move-wise strategies for each move of the stage game are listed, while table S2 lists2
the main classes of strategies.3
In table S3 the full set of strategies is given. In the “Strategies” section of the main text the4
coding of the strategies is explained. Although the setup of our model allows for a great number5
of strategies, we have reduced the strategy space by removing phenotypically indistinguishable6
strategies (see also main text section “Removing phenotypically indistinguishable strategies”). For7
example, if the strategy specifies to always leave in move 2, regardless of the partner’s action, it8
can never punish the partner, since the pair will be broken up and thus the actions specified for9
this move (punish or not punish) will never be played. Some strategies are therefore phenotypically10
indistinguishable in our model, and per set of phenotypically indistinguishable strategies only one11
strategy was used in the strategy space.12
An X in a move-wise strategy in table S3 is a placeholder for a conditional action that is not13
played at any point during the game (C or D in move 1; P or N in move 3). Two strategies that14
are otherwise similar, but di↵ering in this action would therefore never act di↵erently (i.e., they15
are phenotypically indistinguishable). Only one of these two strategies is included in the strategy16
space. This can occur in two situations. First, if an individual leaves after the partner cooperates17
(or defects), then it cannot also punish or conditionally cooperate/defect in the following round18
since the pair is broken up, and thus an X is shown in place of the conditional action in both19
the move-wise strategy for move 1 and 3. Second, we assumed that a punishing act could not be20
followed by a conditional action in move 1 of the following round, and thus the action P in the21
move-wise strategy for move 3 is always combined with an X in the move-wise strategy for move22
1.23
2SM-II Sensitivity analysis24
SM-II.1 Parameter exploration in a well-mixed population25
To test the robustness of our main result (the Sc class dominates for high T ), we explored the26
parameter space more thoroughly than presented in the main text. The exploration was done as27
follows. The parameters Bh and Dp were set either to 2, 2.5, or 3, the parameters Ch and Cp were28
set either to 0.5, 1, or 1.5, and the cost of leaving (Cl) was set either to 0, 1, or 2. For each possible29
combination of these parameters we ran simulations with the number of rounds T ranging from 130
to 100.31
In Fig. S1 the results for four combinations of parameters are shown. If the Bh/Ch ratio is32
low (Bh/Ch = 2/1.5, panel a), we find that a higher number of rounds is required to reach high33
levels of cooperation compared to the baseline case (cf. main text Fig. 2a). Here, the Sc class is34
the dominant class of cooperative strategies. If the Bh/Ch ratio is high (Bh/Ch = 3/0.5, panel35
b), only a few number of rounds is required for high levels of cooperation. The Sc dominates here36
for T   3. If there is no cost of leaving (Cl = 0, panel c), the Sc class is always the dominant37
cooperative class of strategies. If punishment is very e↵ective in terms of payo↵, i.e., the Dp/Cp38
ratio is high (Dp/Cp = 3/0.5, panel d), the Pc class dominates for a larger range of T , compared39
to our baseline case (main text). However, for T > 40 the Sc class is again often found to be40
dominant.41
In short, for any parameter combination we find that, all else being equal, the relative compet-42
itiveness of the Sc class increases with increasing number of rounds.43
SM-II.1.1 Dynamic cost of leaving44
In this section we investigate additional parameter values for a and k when using eq. 1 from the45
main text to calculate the cost of leaving. The results are plotted in Fig. S2. Again we find that,46
although the exact number of rounds where the Sc class becomes dominant depends both on a47
and k, the Sc class will always dominate for high T . This suggests that the Sc class can evolve48
irrespective of the underlying cost function.49
SM-II.1.2 Large T50
To check to what extent the Sc class dominates for large T , we ran simulations with T up to 1000,51
while otherwise using our baseline set of parameters. We find that, although the Sc class is by52
far the most prevalent, other classes of cooperative strategies are maintained above frequencies53
3higher than what would be expected from the mutation rate alone (Fig. S3). This results from54
the fact that the classes of cooperative strategies are nearly neutral in a population consisting of55
mainly those classes (Cc, Rc, Sc, and Pc), since these strategies will gain exactly the same payo↵56
when paired with one another. Therefore, through genetic drift the di↵erent cooperative strategies57
may invade one another. However, uncooperative individuals will continue to enter the population58
via mutation. When paired with uncooperative individuals the cooperative strategies will respond59
di↵erently, and thus gain di↵erent payo↵s. Here, strategies of the Cc class will then be strongly60
selected against, but also strategies of the Rc and Pc class gain less payo↵ on average than those61
of the Sc class. Thus, through a mutation-selection-drift balance this polymorphism is maintained62
in the population.63
SM-II.2 Parameter exploration in a group-structured population64
In this section we present additional results for the group-structured case.65
SM-II.2.1 Group-structure with small T66
In this section, we tested if the Pc class is also relatively more favoured by selection in a structured67
population if T is small. For T = 4 in the well-mixed case the Rc class dominates the population68
(Fig. 2a). Using the same parameters as in the well-mixed case (except T = 4, d = 250, varying69
n), we find again that the Pc class is relatively more favoured by selection (Fig. S4a). Only in very70
large groups the Rc class outcompetes the Pc class (n   350).71
Interestingly, reducing Dp (the payo↵ reduction of being punished) did not a↵ect the frequency72
of the Pc class, but instead negatively a↵ected the frequency of the Rc class (Dp = 1.2, Fig. S4b).73
This was due to Pc strategies having less impact on various defector strategies, which consequently74
increased in frequency, which in turn negatively a↵ected the Rc class, but not the Pc class. How-75
ever, when increasing the cost of punishment (Cp) the Pc class disappeared from the population76
and the Rc class dominated for all but the smallest groups (Cp = 2, n   16, Fig. S4c). This77
discrepancy with Dp is due to Cp a↵ecting the payo↵ of the Pc class directly, while changing Dp78
a↵ects recipients of punishment instead.79
SM-II.2.2 Further parameter exploration80
In this section we present results from a larger parameter space for the group-structured population.81
First, we determined the minimum group size where the Sc class dominates in conditions where82
the Pc is not dominant. To achieve this we used the same parameters as in Fig. 3c from the83
4main text with z = 3. Using these parameters we find that the Pc class no longer dominates, and84
instead the “rest” class and the Rc class dominate in small groups (Fig. S5a). The Sc class is85
now dominant in the population for n   20 (compared to n   32 for z = 5 in Fig. 3c in the main86
text). Thus, even in unfavourable conditions for the Pc class, the Sc class does not dominate in87
populations where interactions occur in small groups.88
In Fig. S5b we use the same parameters as in panel a, but with Cl = 1, T = 7 in order to89
determine if the Sc class can dominate in a group-structured population when T is low. However,90
we find here, similarly to our well-mixed population (Fig. 2a main text), that if T is low the Sc91
class is outcompeted by the Pc and Rc classes for group size smaller than 120, and by the Dc class92
in larger groups. This confirms that the Sc class needs a critical number of rounds in order to be93
favoured by selection over the other classes.94
In Fig. S5c we use the same parameters as Fig. 4b from the main text, with Dp = 1. This95
shows that, although reducing Dp initially a↵ects only the frequency of the Sc and Rc classes96
(main text), if Dp is too low then the Pc disappears completely from the population and the Dc97
class is dominant for all group sizes.98
In Fig. S5d we use the same parameters as in Fig. 4c from the main text, but with T = 7. In the99
well-mixed population we have found that a higher number of rounds generally favours the Pc class100
over the Rc class. Similarly, in Fig. 4c (main text) we find the Rc class dominates if punishment101
is costly to the punisher (Cp = 2). However, if the number of rounds is increased, then we find102
that the Pc is dominant for group size n  60. This confirms that also in the a group-structured103
population, all else being equal, a higher number of rounds increases the relative competitiveness104
of the Pc class over the Rc class.105
SM-III Co-evolution of the Pc class and response to punish-106
ment107
In this section we show that the response to punishment by altering behaviour (x4 = A) co-evolves108
with the Pc class. To demonstrate this we used the same data as our baseline case (main text109
Fig. 2a), but pooled the time average frequency of all strategies into three groups, based on their110
response to punishment (ignore, alter, or leave) (Fig. S6). The frequency of each group is plotted111
together with the frequency of the Pc class. The results show that if Pc strategies are frequent,112
then strategies that alter behaviour after punishment (x4 = A) are also selected for.113
5Table S 1: The sets of move-wise strategies for each move of the stage game. The coding of
strategies is explained in the “Strategies” section.
Move 1: {CCC,CCD,CDC,CDD,DCC,DCD,DDC,DDD}
Move 2: {LL, SS,LS, SL}
Move 3: {PP,NN,PN,NP}
Move 4: {I,A,L}
Table S 2: Main classes of strategies.
Name Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4
Always cooperate Cc CCC SS NN {I,A,L}
Positive reciprocity Rc CCD SS NN {I,A,L}
Partner switching Sc CCC SL NN {I,A,L}
Punishment Pc CCC SS NP {I,A,L}
Always defect Dc DDD SS NN {I,A,L}
6Table S 3: Full set of strategies used in all simulations. The coding is explained in the main text.
Strategy Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4 Strategy Move 1 Move 2 Move 3 Move 4
1 CCC SS NN I 47 DCC SS NN I
2 CCC SS NN A 48 DCC SS NN A
3 CCC SS NN L 49 DCC SS NN L
4 CCD SS NN I 50 DCD SS NN I
5 CCD SS NN A 51 DCD SS NN A
6 CCD SS NN L 52 DCD SS NN L
7 CCX SL NX I 53 DCX SL NX I
8 CCX SL NX A 54 DCX SL NX A
9 CCX SL NX L 55 DCX SL NX L
10 CCX SS NP I 56 DCX SS NP I
11 CCX SS NP A 57 DCX SS NP A
12 CCX SS NP L 58 DCX SS NP L
13 CDC SS NN I 59 DDC SS NN I
14 CDC SS NN A 60 DDC SS NN A
15 CDC SS NN L 61 DDC SS NN L
16 CDD SS NN I 62 DDD SS NN I
17 CDD SS NN A 63 DDD SS NN A
18 CDD SS NN L 64 DDD SS NN L
19 CDX SL NX I 65 DDX SL NX I
20 CDX SL NX A 66 DDX SL NX A
21 CDX SL NX L 67 DDX SL NX L
22 CDX SS NP I 68 DDX SS NP I
23 CDX SS NP A 69 DDX SS NP A
24 CDX SS NP L 70 DDX SS NP L
25 CXC LS XN I 71 DXC LS XN I
26 CXC LS XN A 72 DXC LS XN A
27 CXC LS XN L 73 DXC LS XN L
28 CXD LS XN I 74 DXD LS XN I
29 CXD LS XN A 75 DXD LS XN A
30 CXD LS XN L 76 DXD LS XN L
31 CXX LL XX I 77 DXX LL XX I
32 CXX LS XP I 78 DXX LS XP I
33 CXX LS XP A 79 DXX LS XP A
34 CXX LS XP L 80 DXX LS XP L
35 CXC SS PN I 81 DXC SS PN I
36 CXC SS PN A 82 DXC SS PN A
37 CXC SS PN L 83 DXC SS PN L
38 CXD SS PN I 84 DXD SS PN I
39 CXD SS PN A 85 DXD SS PN A
40 CXD SS PN L 86 DXD SS PN L
41 CXX SL PX I 87 DXX SL PX I
42 CXX SL PX A 88 DXX SL PX A
43 CXX SL PX L 89 DXX SL PX L
44 CXX SS PP I 90 DXX SS PP I
45 CXX SS PP A 91 DXX SS PP A
46 CXX SS PP L 92 DXX SS PP L
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Figure S 1: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of the
number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp =
1, Cl = 1, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 1, n = 10000. Panel specific parameters: Ch = 1.5 (panel a),
Bh = 3, Ch = 0.5 (panel b), Cl = 0 (panel c), Dp = 3, Cp = 0.5 (panel d).
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Figure S 2: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of the
number of rounds T of the repeated game. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Dp = 2, Cp =
1, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 1, n = 10000, using eq. 1 to calculate the cost of switching. Panel specific
parameters: a = 50, k = 0.8 (panel a), a = 100, k = 0.8 (panel b), a = 100, k = 1 (panel c).
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Figure S 3: Same as the baseline case (Fig. 2a, main text) but with a high number of rounds T .
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Figure S 4: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of group
size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, Cl = 1, T = 4, z = T, µ = 0.01, d = 250. Panel specific
parameters: Dp = 2, Cp = 1 (panel a), Dp = 1.2, Cp = 1 (panel b), Dp = 2, Cp = 2 (panel c)
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Figure S 5: Time average frequency (over 106 generations) of the frequency of cooperation (black
line) and the six classes of strategies (Rc, Sc, Pc, Cc, Dc, and “rest”) plotted as a function of
group size n. Parameter values: Bh = 2, Ch = 1, µ = 0.01, d = 250. Panel specific parameters:
Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 0, T = 30, z = 3 (panel a), Dp = 2, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, T = 7, z = 3 (panel b),
Dp = 1, Cp = 1, Cl = 1, T = 4, z = T (panel c), Dp = 2, Cp = 2, Cl = 1, T = 7, z = T (panel d).
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Figure S 6: Same as the baseline case (Fig. 2a, main text), but only showing the frequency of the
Pc class (bars), together with three sets of strategies based on the response to punishment (x4).
The red line is the frequency of all strategies for which x4 = I, the blue line for which x4 = A, and
the green line for which x4 = L.
